Mr. President, we are today, in this country, convulsed by

the situation in Iraq. It is an extraordinary crisis. It is taxing our

men and women in uniform, and it is certainly taxing our resolve.

I think one of the problems is that the administration has not

focused on the reality on the ground, what is really happening on the

ground. They are

hoping, but hope is not a substitute for planning; hope is not a

substitute for a very candid and hard look at the situation on the

ground. The reality is that there is widespread violence and

instability throughout Iraq.

Yesterday, the New York Times reported that

You would think, given this information, that the administration

would begin to reflect on the difficult circumstances on the ground,

but that is not the case. They continue to pursue both policies and

rhetoric which suggest that all is not well yet it is quickly getting

there.

But there is something else they have done which I think is

startling, and that is in a related story in the Washington Post,

information such as what I just quoted, that data from private security

companies is not being recognized and evaluated. It is being

suppressed.

According to today's Washington Post, the

If we don't have accurate information, if we are not able to tell

difficult truth one to another, we will never be able to effectively

design a policy for Iraq.

It is concerning to me that the administration would try to respond

to the facts by suppressing the facts, but that is just one example of

what is going on.

I know this. The country, with some exception, is wracked by

violence. The Kurds in the north have had a semiautonomous region for

many years. It is under our informal protection and formal protection.

That is a part of the country where there is a certain stability, but

there is political tension building there because the Kurdish sense of

autonomy will invariably clash with the need to create a central

government in Iraq.

The focal point of that clash could be the oil around Kirkuk, which

is the second biggest source of oil for the country of Iraq. Those oil

fields could be in jeopardy as a pawn, if you will, in a struggle

between the Kurds asserting their autonomy and the central government

trying to maintain its authority.

We also understand clearly that Sunni provinces have ``no-enter

zones''--areas in which the United States cannot even send its troops

today successfully. One of these areas is Ramadi.

According, again, to a story in the Los Angeles Times on September

28:

In Fallujah, there are similar situations where there are areas we

cannot enter. In the Shia South, there is the instability principally

generated by Sadr, the young cleric who has defied the central

government and also the U.S. repeatedly.

We generally see the violence in Iraq as a function of attacks

against our troops, but when we do that we miss a very important

reality; that is, this violence is only a small portion of the violence

that the Iraqi people feel each day--not from terrorists but from

robbers, burglars, rapists, and murderers.

In June, a poll was conducted. They asked the Iraqi people to list

their top three priorities. Fighting crime represented one of the top

three priorities of 92.8 percent of the people of Iraq. Stopping

attacks on coalition forces represented a top priority of 17.5 percent

of the people of Iraq. On a daily basis, we are seeing not just attacks

against coalition forces and security forces of Iraq, we are seeing a

situation in many places which is beyond chaotic to the point which the

Iraqi people are quickly beginning to assume that we not only are

occupying but we are inept occupiers. We cannot even provide the level

of stability that they enjoyed previously. They have already decided we

are occupiers. They have decided we must go.

The struggle now politically, I think, is you have to recognize that

in this type of conflict it is essentially a political struggle. We can

win tactical victories one after another--and we will--but unless we

create a political dynamic which will coalesce support around the new

Iraqi Government and coalesce cooperation with us, our efforts

tactically will be marginal.

What is happening, though, politically in Iraq now is the fact that

each of these groups and subgroups have one eye on the current

situation, our presence there, but their other focus is on what happens

when we go. Will they be in power? Will they survive? Will they

succeed? That creates a dynamic that is very difficult for us and very

difficult for stability in Iraq.

How did we get there?

It is in some respects a triumph, as I said before, of hope over

history, of ideology, of political calculation, arrogance in some

cases, ignorance that has led us to enter the country ill prepared.

There is a litany of mistakes that are quite obvious: No real plans

for stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq. We should have sensed

that.

I can recall in the fall of 2003 and in succeeding days and months

leading up to the attack last year where we had a situation where we

were trying to get information about stabilization. We didn't have

that. We did not have that information.

In addition, there were insufficient forces to stabilize Iraq and we

were left unprotected for weeks and months, which today has led to a

proliferation of weapons in Iraq, IEDs particularly, the improvised

explosive devices that are bedeviling our forces. We cannot secure

those. We could not secure the borders. We need more troops.

There was a failure to secure multinational support, not only in the

sense of getting the good will, good wishes, and support of the

international community, but particular failures.

We were not able to convince the Turkish Government to allow the use

of Turkey as a point of entry into Iraq. The Fourth Infantry Division,

poised to move through Turkey, to attack in the north, to roll up and

envelop all of the Iraqi forces to the north, was rerouted to the south

because of that lack of cooperation. The consequence on the ground was

literally thousands of Iraqi soldiers were never effectively contested.

They gave up, they disappeared, and apparently reformed as insurgents.

That is another example of the lack of international cooperation that

could have materially assisted us.

We made a significant error in disbanding the Iraqi Army. Rather than

disbanding the army, we should have marched them back to their barracks

and tried at that point to see if we could, through some type of

vetting of officers and senior enlisted people, or some procedure, get

them to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem. They

are part of the problem today. Many of these insurgent leaders, I

believe, have roots going back to the army and the military force

structure, the security forces of Iraq.

Then we conducted a de-Baathification program that applied across the

board. We put that in the hands of Chalabi and others who had no real

legitimacy in the country. As a result, for months and months and

months we prevented teachers and professionals from working. It did not

help in terms of getting schools going quickly. It certainly created

this atmosphere among the Sunni community that they were going to

effectively be marginalized as people and as citizens of Iraq. That

process was a mistake.

Part of that, as I mentioned, was putting misplaced reliance on

Chalabi and his colleagues. I recall he sat as a guest of the First

Lady at this year's State of the Union speech, yet today is accused of

cooperating and perhaps spying for the Iranians. That has been a

mistake.

The CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority, turned out to be not up to

the great task with which they were entrusted. The administration

rejected the traditional agencies of the State Department and their

divisions who have experience in stabilization operations in terms of

political governments, reconstruction, economic development, and put

together an ad hoc group of people who were the architects of what was

a lost year of progress that we should have been making with respect to

Iraq.

And, of course, there was the failure to recognize this insurgency.

We all recall Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks about a few dead-enders. It

was much more than a few dead-enders. It has metastasized into a

virulent and effective force attacking our troops on a daily basis and

attacking the citizens of Iraq.

There was a failure then simply to read the intelligence. We are

debating this intelligence bill today because we have to create--

indeed, it is necessary to create--an intelligence system that is more

effective. Let me point to an intelligence success. This was the

national intelligence estimate. According to a report in the New York

Times,

Very perceptive. It was disregarded by the administration, and I

think disregarded for several reasons. They had a view, which was not

substantiated by the facts, that we would be greeted with open arms.

Principals in the administration said that.

As we debate this intelligence reform, we also have to understand it

is not just producing good intelligence; it is having leaders who

understand and use that intelligence wisely.

Then one of the most critical issues is that we have wasted a year to

train Iraqi security forces. I can recall, as many of my colleagues

recall, being briefed over the past many months. It seemed each

briefing would contain another pie chart showing the growing, growing

Iraqi security forces and the diminishing United States involvement.

All of that was an illusion. These forces were untrained, ill equipped,

unprepared. It took us a year to recognize that and we are only

beginning now to recognize what we have to do to ensure that Iraqi

security forces can, in fact, provide for the security of their

country.

Part of it was a result of the notion that we could do it ourselves,

that this was just a few diehards, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, that we

could root them out and we could deal with them with the coalition

forces. Then it was reluctance to develop an Iraqi security force

because of the fear that they would become another power player in the

very complicated politics of Iraq where it seems the only institutions

that have any type of strength and coherence are the mosques or the

militias, and they sometimes overlap. So for all these reasons, despite

the evidence of growing instability, despite the proliferation of

crime, we have just gotten down to begin to train an effective Iraqi

security force of police, army, national guard, and special operations.

That is a year wasted, a year that should not have been wasted. The

signs were quite clear.

Indeed, even as we focus on this, there have been reports in the

press that General Petraeus, who has been put in charge of this

operation, has not yet received his full complement of American

personnel to help, another example of a delayed reaction, a reaction

based upon hopes that did not materialize. While those hopes were

bandied about here in Washington, the situation got much worse.

All of this leads to an Iraq today that is imposing extraordinary

costs on this country. One of the most obvious and poignant costs is

the loss from American fighting men and women in battle: 1,054 soldiers

have been killed and 7,532 soldiers wounded, who have served this

country with great fidelity and great courage. Their families deserve

our profound respect. We owe them, and we owe their colleagues who

still fight, more wisdom and more truth.

That is why it is particularly frustrating to see this example of a

reaction where, when the facts are uncomfortable, those facts are

suppressed. That is not appropriate given the sacrifices we have seen.

The costs to our Army, particularly, are significant. Personnel

costs. We all understand there were misgivings about the full size of

the force being deployed. When General Shinseki was asked, he did not

volunteer, about the size of the force needed, he said, ``something on

the order of several hundred thousand soldiers,'' and was immediately

castigated by Secretary Rumsfeld, saying this estimate was ``far from

the mark,'' and Secretary Wolfowitz, who called the estimate

``outlandish.''

Then in his few remaining days in the Army, General Shinseki was

personally shunned by the leadership and made to feel entirely

uncomfortable--and I am being very polite. He did not deserve that.

This is a professional soldier who was asked his honest opinion and he

gave it. I wish there were more folks like him in uniform. Certainly

the comments of Secretary Wolfowitz and Secretary Rumsfeld were very

far off the mark. We have over 100,000 troops in place. They probably

will be there for years. There is a strong sign that we need more.

This is a great stress on our military, 17 months after President

Bush declared the end of major combat operations, with over 138,000

troops still stationed in Iraq. They are there because of a patchwork

of different policies the Department of Defense has had to undertake

because they do not have sufficient soldiers. Approximately 16,000

active-duty soldiers have already had two tours in Iraq and if they

stay in the service longer, they will have another. In order to keep

the strength up, they have resorted to stop-loss orders, essentially

telling a soldier, once your unit has been alerted, you are there until

the unit returns home, even if you can leave the service in that

interim. In the words of some, it is a ``backdoor draft.''

Since September 11, DOD has announced six stop-loss policies for the

Army, two for the Navy, five for the Air Force, and two for the Marine

Corps. Only the Army still has a stop-loss policy in place. That is

another way in which to create soldiers by means other than a strictly

voluntary approach.

One of the greatest burdens falls on the Guard and Reserves. Today,

we cannot continue our mission without the brave men and women of our

Army and Air Force Guard and Reserve units. We are asking them to go

way above and beyond the call of duty.

Since September 11, 2001, 422,950 members of the Reserve component

have been mobilized; 51 percent of the Army Guard and 31 percent of the

Air Guard. The average duty days have climbed as a result. Guard and

Reserve men and women are now serving, on average, about 120 days a

year. In fact, back in 2002, it was only 80, and before that it was

much less.

We are looking at a situation which the GAO described as fraught with

consequences. In their words:

We have already seen the National Guard report that they have not

been able to meet their recruiting objectives for the most current

year. So the evidence is beginning to accumulate.

This operation tempo will mean more and more pressure on the military

forces, particularly land forces, and, as a result, you will see the

stress even more, in recruiting and retention, challenging our military

leaders. We need more troops, I believe, as an initial response to the

situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. We should do that

honestly and directly. We should not rely upon supplemental

appropriations. We should not rely on emergency authorizations for

additional troops. We should increase the end strength of the Army and

provide for the payment of that end strength through the regular budget

process, not by supplementals.

Senator Hagel and I offered an amendment to do this last October. In

March, again, Senator Hagel, joined by Senator McCain and I, introduced

a bill that would increase the Army end strength by 30,000 troops. In

May, we together offered an amendment to the fiscal year 2005 Defense

authorization bill to increase the size of the Army by 20,000

personnel, a figure the Army says it could absorb in an efficient way

in 1 year. This was accepted by the Senate, and it is now in conference

with the House.

One point I should make, though, is that, once again, the

administration insisted--even though they oppose the end strength--if

it was to be put in the bill, it still had to be paid for by emergency

funds. That is not the right way to do this. We have to make sure we

have a suitably sized Army.

This is not a spike. This is not a temporary situation. Every time

the President speaks, he talks about staying the course, our long-term

commitment to Iraq. That is not a temporary promise, I do not think. I

think that requires a permanent fix to the size of our Army and to our

Marine Corps.

Now, one of the things that has happened since our debate on the

floor is that the Defense Science Board, a panel of experts appointed

by Secretary Rumsfeld himself, stated: ``Current and projected force

structure will not sustain our current and projected global

stabilization commitments.'' There are ``inadequate total numbers'' of

troops and a ``lack of long term endurance.''

That is the conclusion of experts who have studied this issue, who

have looked at all the things the Army is doing through modularity,

through technical improvements and technological innovations to

minimize the need for additional troops, and they have concluded, as a

result of the study requested by the Secretary of Defense, that we need

more troops.

It is not only troops. We also need equipment. The Army has sustained

$2.439 billion in equipment battle losses in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Presently, the Army has an unfunded requirement for $1.322 billion for

munitions.

Last year, the Army spent $4 billion on equipment reconstitution--

resetting it, repairing it, and getting it ready to go again.

The Marine Corps expects to need over $1 billion to reconstitute

equipment next year.

The GAO reports that since September 11, the Army Guard has

transferred 22,000 pieces of equipment from non-deploying units to units

deployed in Iraq. What we have is a huge reshuffling going on, as units

back in the United States take their equipment and give it out to units

that are deploying forward. It leaves these units back in the United

States without equipment. If they are called upon to perform a mission,

another international mission, a homeland security mission, or a

mission involving a natural disaster, where are they going to get the

equipment they deployed overseas? How are they going to be affected?

In addition to the National Guard and Reserves, the Active Army is

resetting itself under new battle formations, modularity, which is a

concept that I think is ingenious, a concept that should be supported.

But as they are doing this, they too are shuffling equipment about.

There are some units that are not yet up to speed with all their

equipment. They will have it, I am sure, before they are deployed

overseas, but it is another example of the turmoil in terms of

equipment we are seeing within the military.

In order to respond accurately, correctly, and directly to the

situation in Iraq, we have to increase our Army, I believe, and make

sure they have the resources to have the equipment they need to do the

job.

Now, the funding for our operations in Iraq has been primarily

through supplementals. In the past 17 months, President Bush has

requested and Congress has appropriated $187 billion for the wars in

Iraq and Afghanistan. For comparison, the budgets for the Department of

Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of

Education, and the Department of Interior total $163 billion. So we

have been spending in Iraq more money than we allow for discretionary

spending for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,

Education, and Interior.

The last supplemental, for $25 billion, was passed in May 2004. At

that time, the administration said they would not need the funding

until January or February of next year, 2005. Yet it has been reported

this week that $2 billion of this fund has already been used, showing

the huge, huge pressure, the huge cost of our operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan.

Last week, President Bush announced he plans to divert nearly $3.5

billion from Iraqi water, power, and other reconstruction projects to

security, another indication, I think, that the security situation is

in very difficult circumstances.

We have been funding these operations with supplementals. But we

cannot continue to do that because there will be a point, I believe, at

which the American people will be very concerned, when each year we are

forced to vote on $60, $70, $80 billion of supplemental funding for

Iraq and Afghanistan. We know this effort is going to take many, many

years. People talk about it as a generational struggle, and I think

that is right. We have to prepare for that struggle, but we cannot do

it in ad hoc supplemental budgeting.

We also have seen, of course, the terrible incidents of abuse in Abu

Ghraib, with too few troops in that prison to do the job, ill-trained

troops in that prison to do the job, but it is not just those troops. I

think it is wrong simply to single out people we know from photographs

who have done despicable things. They will be punished. They are being

punished. We have a responsibility to look not only at the young

soldiers, but the leadership, the chain of command, the policies they

adopted or did not adopt, the confusion they created and did not

resolve. We have had several investigations so far. Each one goes a

little bit down the road but then seems to stop.

We waited, frankly, for months for the report of General Fay and

General Jones, thinking this would be the final authoritative report

that would look from the level of three star and four star all the way

down. It turns out that for one of the most significant issues, the

issue of ghost detainees--those individuals who were not properly

recorded by the authorities when they came into our custody--General

Jones and Fay had no real answers because they didn't get any

cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency. Now we have another

investigation presumably conducted by the IG and the Department of

Defense. This is not the way to get to the core of what happened. It

might be an effective way of postponing real review and investigation,

but it is not the way to get the answers.

These answers are important, not simply because of individual

culpability of soldiers up and down the ranks, but because we have to

have a military force that understands that they are subject to the

laws, that it is not optional for leaders to ignore some or modify them

at will. This is the very challenging situation, but it is an example,

once again, of the lack of preparedness, the lack of sufficient

personnel, and the lack of clear guidance that has plagued our

operations in Iraq from the beginning.

I have spent a great deal of time talking about Iraq. The interesting

thing in some respects is what we are not talking about. We are not

talking about North Korea. But just this week on Monday, at the United

Nations, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon said North Korea had been

left with ``no other option but to possess a nuclear deterrent''

because of U.S. policies that he said were designed to eliminate his

country. He stated:

Reprocessing 8,000 rods would extract enough plutonium for as many as

eight nuclear warheads. Here is a situation where, as we focused on

Iraq, we have sat by as the North Koreans blatantly and boldly opened

up the cans in which IAEA sealed the rods and, according to their

comments, have reprocessed this material into nuclear weapons. One of

the worst possible situations, a nuclear-armed North Korea, may have

evolved. We are at this point taking troops out of South Korea to

fulfill our requirements in Iraq. What signal does that send to the

North Koreans?

It is not a question of deterrence. We have the capability of

deterring the

North Koreans from coming south. But it certainly is not aiding us in

what ultimately must be our objective of disarming North Korea,

hopefully through peaceful means and through negotiations, not just our

efforts alone but the world community, because the great fear that we

all have, that transcends the current struggle in Iraq, is that

terrorists will obtain nuclear material and nuclear weapons.

Here we have a situation where over the last several months the North

Koreans have finally said: We have them. Part of our lack of response

is an internal debate within the administration that has been going on

for months, if not years: Do you negotiate, which means some type of

arrangement between the world and North Korea, or do you once again

embark on a regime change operation? The difference over the last

several months is the growing realization that Iraq has put so much

stress on our military forces, that in the event of a need to disarm

North Korea, there would be far fewer forces to draw on. So that is

another huge cost of our involvement in Iraq.

Then add another development: The Iranians continue to insist they

have every right to a full, complete nuclear fuel cycle. Of course, the

concern--not just of the United States but the international

community--is that if they achieve that cycle, they will be able to

obtain material with which to construct a nuclear weapon.

Despite their protestations that that is not their objective, there

is a growing suggestion, if not conclusive evidence, that certainly

that possibility might exist. And once again, what are we doing? Why

have we not focused attention on Iran in a more meaningful and decisive

way?

One has to question a strategy that has led us into Iraq, to the

instability, to the costs, to the lost opportunity, when there appear

to be much more serious threats abroad.

We have an opportunity to be much more candid, much more truthful

about what is going on. That is an opportunity I would hope the

administration would embrace because unless we operate with the facts

and unless we operate with the reality of the situation, there will be

no way we can effectively plan to deal with the threats we face.

I yield the floor.